

Mutual Defense Cooperation Among US Allies with Historical Conflicts


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1. Abstract

Defense cooperation between nation states is often a large part of international security systems, and takes differing levels of cooperation between all states that are involved. There are many different explanations for what leads nations to create direct mutual defense cooperation, but these do not all apply in cases of nations with historical conflict. This paper seeks to answer the question of what factors cause two nations, who also have the United States as a major ally, to create direct mutual defense cooperation when they have had significant historical conflict between them? The argument of this paper is that nations have significant and direct defense cooperation despite their historical conflicts when the United States places direct conditionality on the reconciliation and/or cooperation, and when there is reconciliation between the two nations. The dependent variable in this paper is the creation of direct bilateral defense cooperation. The independent variables are the conditionality of support by the United States with the two nations on security issues, and the level of reconciliation between the nations before the alliance was formed. After conducting case studies, the overall findings of this research is that the hypotheses are not supported. In the Greece and Turkey case study there was conditional support by the United States, there has been an accepted amount of reconciliation, and there has also been mutual defense cooperation. France and Germany were found to have reconciliation, while the case study of Israel and the Gulf States were found not to have reconciliation, but both had unconditional support from the US and defense cooperation. The Japan and South Korea case study showed that even with conditionality of US support present in the relationship of the nations, reconciliation is not always an outcome, and neither is defense cooperation. Reconciliation is not considered to be a large factor in terms of defense

cooperation, considering reconciliation was defined as involving recognition and apologies for the conflict.

2. Introduction

Defense cooperation between nation states is often a large part of international security systems, and takes differing levels of cooperation between all states that are involved. The level of involvement in defense collaboration between states can vary due to the different ways in which cooperation is created and the extent to which a state is needed, interested in, or pressured to cooperate. Nations with poor relations may not have the same incentives or interests in creating defense cooperation if they can afford to, or have other means of security. Cooperation can be created through formal and informal alliances, treaties and agreements, which can all themselves involve nations in different ways. Defense cooperation can include simply giving verbal support for an ally in a current conflict, sending troops to help fight in a war, sharing security details and programs, creating joint military programs, financial support towards defense and security issues, and more.

Different types of agreements and alliances create varying levels of cooperation due to their size, purpose and the time in which they are created or observed. In times of peace, the level of direct cooperation needed between states may not be as great as in times of war or conflict, which is why the functionality and intent behind agreements should be assessed. In large multilateral alliances, direct and significant cooperation is not often needed between every nation in the alliance, as they are often broken into smaller units to cover different aspects of defense, or certain nations are involved to a greater extent than others. There can be instances in

Ibid.
Ibid.

which direct cooperation is created between nations in multilateral alliances that may otherwise not be working together, either because the multilateral alliance is small, or the nations both have a significant mutual interest or threat. Bilateral alliances in comparison are created with only two nations and if they are meant to be functional alliances, not a spoken alliance with no follow through intended, require a much higher level of direct cooperation between nations. Treaties and agreements can follow in the format of being between multiple nations or only two nations and therefore would create different levels of cooperation.

There are many different explanations for what leads nations to create direct mutual defense cooperation, but in the cases of nations that have had significant historical conflict, these explanations do not all apply. This paper seeks to answer the question of what factors cause two nations, who also have the United States as a major ally, to create direct mutual defense cooperation when they have had significant historical conflict between them? The argument of this paper is that nations have significant and direct defense cooperation despite their historical conflicts when the United States places direct conditionality on the reconciliation and/or cooperation, and when there is reconciliation between the two nations. The dependent variable in this paper is the creation of direct bilateral defense cooperation. This is measured as a bilateral defense or military alliance, agreement, or treaty, including those that are part of a larger multilateral alliance, between the two case study nations after the historical conflict has occurred. The independent variables are the conditionality of support by the United States with the two nations on security issues, and the level of reconciliation between the nations before the alliance was formed. The cases will be chosen based upon significant historical conflicts and having a mutual defense alliance of either type, bilateral or multilateral, with the United States.

3. Methodology:

To measure the dependent variable, instances of significant mutual defense cooperation between the case study nations after a historical conflict will be recorded. Defense cooperation will be considered as specific defense agreements, mutual security cooperation deals, security alliances, and agreements that account for direct cooperation between the two nations being observed in the case studies. For this research paper, the different types of defense cooperation will be accounted for in bilateral and multilateral defense alliances and will only be considered if it is a significant level and direct between the case nations. The level of significance will be determined if the agreement made is intended to be functional, not an agreement signed that is never intended to be implemented, or one that is never implemented. This functional level will be accounted for by accounting for defense agreements that result in portions being implemented after the creation, including practice drills, transferring information, or any aspect that is part of the specific agreement being implemented.

The directness of the cooperation will be measured by accounting for the amount of cooperation it calls for and type of agreement created. The difference in the type of alliance is important to consider because if there are several nations involved in the alliance, the case study nations could both be part of the same alliance, but not have any or have very little direct mutual defense cooperation. Any bilateral defense alliances will be considered as mutual defense cooperation, as these are direct alliances or agreements made between two nations only, but these alliances do have to be for security or defense purposes and meet the significance criteria. Multilateral defense alliances will not always be considered as being an example of the dependent variable because there would be more than the two case study nations in the alliance. Multilateral alliances will be observed in more depth than bilateral alliances to see if

Ibid.
Ibid.

there are any specific parts of the agreement that have created instances requiring direct mutual cooperation on security or defense issues between the two nations. If there is not any aspect of the alliance that creates direct cooperation between the two nations, then that multilateral alliance will not be considered as being an example of the dependent variable.

The first independent variable that will be explored is the level of conditionality of the United States' support as an ally. There are several important aspects to consider with this variable, such as the level of involvement the US has had in the creation or push for a bilateral defense alliance between the other states. The conditionality of US support is important to consider because depending on how high or low the conditionality, there may not be a desire or need to mend relations with between the two smaller powers. The US is a large international power that provides a large source of military and security support to many of its allies, who would not have as strong international presence without it, so the conditionality level is important to account for when testing for defense cooperation. This variable will be measured first by determining the type of alliance between the United States and the nations being observed and how important they find the US's support. Once this is established, the level of conditionality will be determined to be high or low, dependent on the US's involvement, stated conditions, and whether or not the smaller power nations are concerned that the US will truly withdraw their support. Any threats and public international issues between the two nations where relations worsen will also be accounted to for to determine how the US's conditionality is affecting the nations.

The second independent variable will be measured by determining the level of reconciliation between the two nations, considering a recent historical conflict has taken place between them. This is important to explore, as different nations have had significant conflict(s) between them,

which generally leaves for a level of resentment between the people and governments of these nations. This will be measured by accounting for the number of public apologies and reconciliation acts given, the level of public acceptance, and whether it has met or exceeded the demands made by the victim country and people, within reason. The demands cannot be unreasonable, such as not creating extreme situations or asking for far too much in monetary payment. The level of public acceptance will be measured by gaining surveys directly about the public opinion of the event or nations after the apology. It will also be accounted for whether the US's support is conditional or unconditional, and if the US mitigated the situation or called for meetings or apologies to be given.

The hypotheses being tested are as follows:

Hypothesis 1: If the U.S. commitment is *conditional*, the states *will* reconcile.

Hypothesis 2: If the U.S. alliance is *unconditional*, the states *will not* reconcile

Hypothesis 3: When there is both conditionality and reconciliation, there will be direct mutual defense cooperation.

Hypothesis 4: When there is unconditional support and no reconciliation, there will not be direct mutual defense cooperation.

4. Selection Criteria:

The cases that will be used to test the hypothesis will be chosen based on specific criteria. The case studies will be two nations that have had a relevant and significant historical conflict between them that created a lasting poor relationship between them that would cause cooperation to be difficult to achieve. Some examples of a significant historical conflict are wars, occupations, and colonization that leaves one nation to be considered a victim, or has had a

Ibid.
Ibid.

lasting impact that has lead to relations being difficult to create and has left lasting resentment either present in the governments or in the civilian populations, or both. One measure that will be taken to narrow down the amount of cases is to limit the time period in which the conflict could have occurred to be relevant. To make sure the conflict is relevant I will only be considering conflicts that have happened since the year 1900. The conflict does not need to only involve the two nations being studied in the case study, but both nations do have to be part of this conflict with one one one side of the conflict and the other state on the opposing side.

The other criteria being used to choose case study dyadic pairs is if the case nations have a form of defense cooperation or relationship with the United States. This is so that the level of involvement and overall influence by the US in the matter can be considered. This criterion for case selection is also being set so that if there is involvement by the United States, either through having a very strong alliance or through the US even having direct involvement in the pursuit of defense cooperation, will determine if this is even relevant.

5. Literature Review

There has been much debated research surrounding alliance formation, alliance behavior, and the different possible factors that can impact it. To begin with, one popular theory of alliance formation is that alliances with similar regime types often ally together more often than nations who are of different regime types.¹Douglas Gibbler and Scott Wolford argue in their study

1 Gibler, Douglas M., and Scott Wolford. 2006. "Alliances, Then Democracy: An Examination of the Relationship Between Regime Type and Alliance Formation". *The Journal of Conflict Resolution* 50 (1).

“Alliances, Then Democracy: An Examination of the Relationship Between Regime Type and Alliance Formation” that alliances are often just tools that nations use to deter territorial threats and democracies are more likely to be members of an alliance.² One interesting aspect of Gibbler and Wolford’s research is their conclusions that democracies are more likely to be members of alliances, but are not likely to create alliances between themselves.³

The independent variables that Gibbler and Wolford explore in their study is not only the regime type, but the level of cultural similarity, and the level of joint threat that the dyadic nations experience.⁴ The overall conclusion by Gibbler and Wolford is that democracies are not likely to form alliances with each other, something they account for the general cluster that democracies tend to form regionally.⁵ Another conclusion that they make is that democracies are not always formed when the nation joins an alliance, which can account for the lack of joint democracy alliances.⁶ The issue with this argument made by authors is that they do not fully account for all types of regime type, and many of the other factors that can impact the creation of an alliance. These authors, despite their topic seem to be mostly concerned with democracies and the relationship between them rather than the full extent that regime type can impact an alliance.

2 Ibid. 137.

3 Ibid.

4 Ibid. 138.

5 Ibid. 151. ⁶ Ibid. 151.

Ibid.
Ibid.

Anessa Kimball also explores the relationship between alliance formation and regime type in her article "Alliance Formation and Conflict Initiation: The Missing Link". Kimball argues that regime type influences alliance formation, and that democratic nations are more likely to ally than non democracies.⁶ Kimball has a similar conclusion about regime type to Gibbler and Wolford, in that the impact of regime type is likely to be dependent on which years are studied.⁷ Kimball's main argument however is the relationship between conflict initiation and alliance formation, and how alliance formation can impact conflict initiation.⁸ Her main conclusion is that alliance formation is capable of deterring conflict initiation between allies because of the costs associated with conflicts and the losses a nation would face to engage in conflict.⁹ This research does not account for variables such as mutual threats or the historical relationship between nations, or even the economic relationship between countries, which makes her argument weaker in that it does not fully account for other significant factors that would either lead nations into conflict or away from conflict besides an alliance forming between the two.

Gibler explores other causes for alliance formation in his article "The costs of reneging, reputation and alliance formation.". In this study, Gibler explores the extent to which reputation

6 Kimball, Anessa L. 2006. "Alliance Formation and Conflict Initiation: The Missing Link." *Journal of Peace Research* 43 (4).

7 Ibid.

8 Ibid.

9 Ibid. 386.

can impact alliance formation and dispute behavior.¹⁰ Gibler uses reputation as a measure for whether or not leaders will seek other leaders to ally with, arguing that if reputations are important to leaders, then they will form alliances with leaders who have held their previous alliance commitments.¹² In the opposite side, if reputations are important to leaders, then they will not choose to form alliances with leaders with a poor reputation for not holding their alliance commitments.¹³ Despite the large number of independent variables, which Gibler does note as either important or less important, one thing lacking from his research is a more expansive exploration of reputation. Gibler's definition and testing of reputation is limited to the reputation based on holding alliance commitments previously or not. Something that may prove to have a different effect on alliance formation in terms of reputation, is exploring the general reputation of a nation in terms of corruption level and international conflicts they have created. The research is limited because of this setup, and may prove to have different results if the variable of reputation was more expansive and detailed.

In "Toward a Network Theory of Alliance Formation" Cranmer, Desmarais, and Kirkland, argue that alliances form due to alliance networks.¹¹ Alliance networks lead alliances to form because allies like to "close" their alliance networks into "closed triangles".¹² Alliance

10 Gibler, Douglas M. "The costs of renegeing reputation and alliance formation." *Journal of Conflict Resolution* 52, no. 3 (2008): 427 ¹² Ibid. ¹³ Ibid.

11 Cranmer, Skyler J., Bruce A. Desmarais, and Justin H. Kirkland. 2012. "Toward a Network Theory of Alliance Formation." *International Interactions* 38, no. 3.

12 Ibid.

Ibid.
Ibid.

networks evolve when military power and political compatibility are also factors that are present, which lead to dyadic alliances to create their own networks.¹³ This study is limited, in that it only looks at their own defined factors that are present in alliance networks, and lack other independent variables that can lead to alliance formation. The network theory is an important theory in alliance formation, but this article limits itself in the scope of their research instead of allowing for a newer interpretation of network theory.¹⁷

Benjamin Fordham explores why nations create asymmetrical alliances in his article “Trade and Asymmetric Alliances”. Fordham asks two questions, first why larger powers would create an alliance with a much weaker nation, and second to what extent does trade influence this type of alliance formation?¹⁴ Fordham argues that major powers are more likely to create alliances with weaker nations when they are trading partners.¹⁵ Fordham uses several independent variables to explore the formation of asymmetrical alliances, these being trade, distance between countries, the military strength, and similarity of interests.¹⁶ Fordham concludes that major powers will help their allies when there is a level of trade between the two, as a mechanism to protect their interests.²¹ This research by Fordham is important as it explores asymmetric alliances and what causes nations to form alliances with nations that cannot benefit them militarily.

13 Ibid. ¹⁷ Ibid.

14 Fordham, Benjamin O. 2010. “Trade and Asymmetric Alliances”. *Journal of Peace Research* 47 (6).

15 Ibid.

16 Ibid. ²¹ Ibid.

In “Regional Trade Agreements as Military Alliances”, Kathy L. Powers asks two questions, with one being more important than the other to this research paper. The first question is what are the consequences of regional trade agreement military alliances on militarized conflict involving the member states of the alliances.¹⁷ This question is not the more important aspect of her research, but rather the question of if regional trade agreements are also considered to be a military alliance, is the more important question of the article.²³ Powers separates the traditional military alliances that nations create from regional trade agreements, and concludes that regional trade agreements are indeed a form of military alliance. This is because in regional trade agreements, there are certain criteria created that are based on the structure of traditional military agreements, and trade is an added component according to Powers.²⁴ This is an important aspect of alliance formation to research, because it expands the definition of an alliance through adding another type of agreement that could also qualify as a defense alliance.

In her article “Negotiating Military Alliances: Legal Systems and Alliance Formation” Emilia J. Powel seeks to answer whether the domestic legal institutions of a state can influence the likelihood of creating a military alliance.¹⁸ Powel argues that nations with similar legal intuitions are more likely to create a military alliance, as they will negotiate using the same

17 Powers, Kathy L. "Regional Trade Agreements as Military Alliances." *International Interactions* 30, no. 4 ²³ Ibid. ²⁴ Ibid.

18 Powell, Emilia Justyna. "Negotiating military alliances: Legal systems and alliance formation." *International Interactions* 36, no. 1 (2010).

Ibid.
Ibid.

“legal language” and therefore will be more likely to understand each other and seek the same outcome. In her study, Powell’s independent variables are the type of legal system, and measuring the level of interaction between nations with different types of legal system to gauge their familiarity with nations with other types of legal systems.¹⁹ Her study concludes that when states have similar legal systems they are more likely to create an alliance, because states with similar legal knowledge are able to negotiate in the same way and therefore be more productive.

Powell’s conclusions however, do not only find that her independent variables are not the only factors responsible for making this connection more likely. In fact, Powell notes that her control variables that are more in line with traditional alliance formation theory, also play a very important role in alliance formation, and these variables include power, security threats and security interests.²⁰

Anessa Kimball explores the question of why alliances form even when there is no mutual threat between the alliance members in her article “Political Survival, Policy Distribution, and Alliance Formation”.²¹ Kimball explores also, the aspect of domestic politics and the impact that domestic politics can have on alliance formation.²² Kimball makes an interesting argument in her paper, that alliance form due domestic politics, and that nations

19 Ibid.

20 Ibid.

21 Kimball, Anessa L. 2010. “Political Survival, Policy Distribution, and Alliance Formation”. *Journal of Peace Research* 47 (4).

22 Ibid.

actively seek alliances as a form of outside security so that their money can be largely spent elsewhere.²³ Kimball concludes that social policy need in a nation leads to leaders actively seeking alliances to utilize their resources on their nation's social needs.²⁴ Democratic nations were found to cater to these social policy needs than other types of regimes, and external threats were also found to have an effect on alliance behavior.³² Kimball's research is significant because it gives a newer analysis of why states would form an alliance when direct threats are not the issue. This is important because it addresses the domestic factors that would lead to creating an alliance as a way of outsourcing their security needs.

Victor Cha argues that the security structure in East Asia developed much differently than the rest of the world due to the United States involvement and alliance formation in his article "Powerplay Origins of the US Alliance System in Asia".²⁵ Cha argues that the bilateral structure in the East Asian security is because of the US's involvement and creation of bilateral agreements.²⁶ The US has created large multilateral security alliances in other regions of the world, leaving East Asia as bilateral structure to make it easier to maintain control.²⁷ Cha addressed the difference between the post war alliance formation in Europe and in East Asia,

23 Ibid.

24 Ibid. ³² Ibid.

25 Cha, Victor D. 2009. "Powerplay: Origins of the U.S. Alliance System in Asia". *International Security* 34 (3). The MIT Press

26 Ibid.

27 Ibid. ³⁶ Ibid.

Ibid.
Ibid.

concluding that the US sought to maintain control in both regions, but had a growing fear of an ally going rogue in East Asia leading them to assert even more control through a bilateral alliance.³⁶

This article provided a partial basis for interest in the independent variable in this research paper of why the level of United States involvement is relevant. The United States is described as being a leader in defense and security issues, as well as creating a very large security network in many different parts of the world. The US's involvement in defense cooperation is important because if the United States were heavily involved in the creation of direct mutual cooperation, then it could be formed for reasons not directly related to the interests of the two nations involved.

In “Abandonment, Entrapment, and Neoclassical Realism in Asia: The United States, Japan, and Korea”, Victor D. Cha argues that the commitment of the United States in security issues in North East Asia has led to a direct impact on the cooperation of Japan and South Korea.²⁸ Cha uses the already conceived notion of a “quasi-alliance” between the ROK and Japan, meaning they have a shared major ally in the form of the US but are not direct allies themselves. He argues that the perception of the commitment by the United States (the larger super power) to the security in the region, has a direct impact on Japan and Korea's direct political and military cooperation.²⁹ Cha believes that while history and the historical conflicts between the two states have an impact on their relations, the most important thing to their

28 Cha, Victor D. “Abandonment, Entrapment, and Neoclassical Realism in Asia: The United States, Japan, and Korea” *International Studies Quarterly* June 2000, 44. (2)

29 Ibid. 261.

cooperation is not this, but is based on the fear of US abandonment and he refers to this as the level of patron commitment.³⁰

Cha adds that when there is a quasi-alliance based on a patron power and two lesser powers, where the weaker powers are reliant on the patron, the patron's promises matter more than the threat of a mutual threat. If both nations have a fear of abandonment and entrapment, but with an unequal spread of it then there will be issues between them. In comparison, if they both feel an equal spread of abandonment then cooperation between the two will occur. The level of patron commitment not only can impact the formation of alliances directly, but also can cause the view on the external threat to change, and even become increased if commitment is lower. Since he used the US, Japan, and South Korean alliances, he concludes that the US has been successful as a bargaining power in this relationship, not solely on external threats felt by Japan and the ROK, but rather due to the fear of the other two that the US will become disengaged and uncommitted.³¹

Ronald R. Krebs seeks to answer what effect does membership in an institutionalized multilateral alliance have on the relations of small powers in his article "Perverse institutionalism: NATO and the Greco-Turkish conflict".³² Krebs' central hypothesis revolves specifically on the Greco-Turkish conflict and NATO. He argues that although the conflict

30 Ibid. 261.

31 Ibid.

32 Krebs, Ronald R. "Perverse institutionalism: NATO and the Greco-Turkish conflict." *International Organization* 53, no. 02 (1999).

Ibid.
Ibid.

between the two nations has been existent long before NATO, the alliance is responsible for a large portion of tensions between the nations after it was formed. His overall view on alliances is that even though many researchers believe that alliances often bridge relations between nations, even when they have had serious conflicts in the past, alliances are not always beneficial to international relations and do not guarantee that there will be no future conflicts between the nations involved. Krebs uses the term “realist institutionalism”, which he describes as being an in between state between the ideas that institutions are only beneficial to gain power, or that they are a means to solving conflicts.

Krebs concludes first that institutions such as alliances have the ability to reshape and change the way that nations interact with each other, as well as their interests. In the case study of Greek, Turkey and NATO, Krebs concludes that the alliance allowed them to not only gain an external force for military conflicts, but it allowed them both to focus their attention onto different foreign policy goals and lead to greater issues with each other and other allies. Due to the heightened tensions between the two as well as the other allies and adversaries, the transparency available through being in a multilateral alliance together only made tensions worse, as it allowed both sides to know the majority of the strengths and weaknesses of each other. The issue linkages created between Greece and Turkey only created points of bargaining for each nation in trying to gain more control in the alliance which is another sign of their continued conflicts. Despite Krebs concluding that overall institutionalized alliances do not always achieve the goal of facilitating cooperation and can even harm the overall level of cooperation, these alliances should not be considered to never be successful, as in many cases they have existed and those involved have significantly lessened conflicts between them. Krebs concludes that the Greco-Turkey alliance through NATO is an example of how these

institutional expectations can not only go differently than intended, but backfire into created greater and more complex conflicts and involve even more nations.³³

In "Cooperative hegemony: power, ideas and institutions in regional integration" Thomas Pedersen seeks to answer the question of why larger, more powerful nations willingly join in regional institutions that are more than a simple alliance?³⁴ Pedersen argues that security and power are the main determinants of regionalism in the formative stages of these regional institutions. He then moves away from a standard regional hegemony theory, and rather moves towards a "co-operative hegemony" which is best explained by the motives and strategy from the powerful nations in the region. Pedersen also argues that in the regions where regional institutionalism has succeeded, many of them have had an asymmetric hegemony and the largest power has been the one to initiate the alliance or institutionalism, and in contrast he also argues that many of the cases where regionalism has failed that there has not been any super power presence. Pedersen adds that his theory of "co-operative hegemony" gives a general explanation on regionalism and the strategies and motives that lead to them rather than focusing on the outcomes. Major states take an interest into regional alliances with other smaller nations to advance their interests without resorting to coercion.³⁵

33 Ibid.

34 Pedersen, Thomas. "Cooperative hegemony: power, ideas and institutions in regional integration." *Review of International Studies* 28, no. 04 (2002).

35 Ibid. 678.

Ibid.
Ibid.

In Jennifer Lind's *Sorry States: Apologies in International Politics*, Lind creates a detailed argument for why some nations such as West Germany have been able to move on from their past atrocities, while others like Japan have not.³⁶ While contrition and apologies have been argued as the source of reconciliation between nations, Lind argues that there are some limits to what a nation can do in terms of apologies and reconciliation acts, due to the internal conflicts that can take place if the domestic civilians and officials feel as though they have gone too far.

The two particular cases that Lind takes focus on are France and Germany, and Japan and South Korean relations after World War II considering it caused a large source of conflict between the pairs of nations.³⁷

Lind's main argument is that contrition is not a necessary requirement for reconciliation to happen, even after a large conflict involving horrible crimes and atrocities.³⁸ Rather than apologies and contrition being a necessary factor leading to nations reconciling, it is more important for nations to lose their created perception that they are a threat to each other. Apologies in comparison can create unwanted extra conflict, by either asking and expecting too much, if they are perceived as less than what is expected, and if they are needed to be repeated again and again, it can lead to greater distrust and further conflict between the two nations.³⁹ The most important thing to reconciliation according to Lind is the nation's history remembrance, as the way in which a nation remembers its own path influences the ways in which the international

36 Lind, Jennifer M. *Sorry States: Apologies in International Politics*. 2008.

37 Ibid.

38 Ibid. 3.

39 Ibid.

community perceives them.⁴⁰ This aspect is the most important as it does not directly involve creating apologies and contrition for past actions, but rather the nation reshaping their own remembrance of history, making themselves seem like less of a threat to the international community and more importantly to the nation they have the most troubled past with.

According to Lind, Japan and South Korea have not been able to repair their relationship because of many failed apologies from Japan to South Korea over the years.⁴¹ Japan and the United States however have been able to create and maintain relations despite the conflicts between them during the same time period, with little contrition after the end of WWII between the two nations. Although this does not directly seem related to my hypothesis and independent variable of the level of reconciliation, I account that any apology being made or expected only need to meet expectations to an extent, as demands that create extreme situations or asking for far too much in monetary payment are unreasonable and will create more conflicts.

6. Case Studies

The case studies for this paper have been chosen based on the parameters explained previously in the “Selection Criteria”. The case studies therefore will be conducted using pairs of nations who have had significant historical conflicts since the year 1900, and are both in security alliances with the United States. The independent variables will be applied to the following pairs of nations to test the hypotheses:

40 Ibid.

41 Ibid.

Ibid.
Ibid.

1. Germany and France
2. Turkey and Greece
3. Israel and the Gulf
4. Japan and South Korea

A brief explanation pertaining to the selection of each case study follows: Germany and France have had significant conflicts in the past, but the most relevant and lasting is due to World War II and the Nazi occupation of France. Both Germany and France have had security cooperation and alliances with the United States since this time period. Turkey and Greece, although seemingly smaller powers in global security, have been considered to be a vital piece of global security in the Mediterranean since the end of WWII. The US has taken a special interest in the two nations, especially during the Cold War in which the two nations continued to have unstable relations, and the relationship between all three nations has shifted several times. Israel and the Gulf were chosen because of the interesting dynamic and long standing relations between the nations and the United States, as well as the change in stability in the region in the recent years. Japan and South Korea have had many conflicts over the time span of their interactions, but the most recent and significant conflict that has created long-lasting complications, is the brutal Japanese colonization of Korea in the early 19th century as well as the events within WWII. In terms of case study selections, Japan and South Korea provide the basis for the interest in the research while the remaining case studies were chosen strictly on the selection criteria without specific interests.

Germany and France

In the case of Germany and France, the overall level of conditionality is low. The conditionality is low due to the lack of instances where the US made conditions for French and

German reconciliation or calls for relations between the two to be regulated. This is mostly due to the fact that the US was the largest power in the region following World War II, West Germany was under British, American and French control, and France was a recovering power that began to make its own offers to Germany in hopes of creating a counter balance to the United States' presence. There have been several attempts, some unsuccessful but the majority successful, for reconciliation and therefore the variable of reconciliation is high. Significant reconciliation acts began in 1950 when Federal Chancellor Adenauer called for closer relations and was met with then French Foreign Minister Robert Schuman's call for a United Europe including Germany. There have been other significant acts of reconciliation that will be further explained below. The dependent variable of direct mutual cooperation is present. Direct mutual defense cooperation began with the alliance treaty between France and Germany in 1963 when the Elysee treaty was signed, but active defense cooperation after World War II did not fully begin until the 1980's.⁴²

Germany and France have had a very troubled past, going back centuries, but in the 20th century it became the most troubled in history. This is much like any relationship between Germany and their regional neighbors after the World Wars and some from before. France was occupied by Nazi Germany, and was treated brutally by the Germans, which has been the greatest and most recent source of conflict and resentment between the two nations. Both France and Germany have been able to move on from their former history, and become close allies economically and militarily, both being members of NATO and the European Union.

The beginning of reconciliation between France and Germany was signed on January 22,
42 "Military." Franco-German Brigade.

Ibid.
Ibid.

1963 in the form of the Elysee treaty.⁴³ This treaty marks the beginning of German and French “friendship” after the conflict that began long before the World wars.⁴⁴ This treaty was held as being very important, because both Germany and France sought to unite Europe after the devastation of WWII, and these two super powers who had conflicts going back centuries, were looked at as a way to truly begin to unite Europe again.

The first independent variable being explored is conditionality of United States support to both nations as both were involved and dependent on US security forces following WWII. The US conditionality variable is not present in this case study, and therefore conditionality is low. The relationship between the United States, France and Germany during the Post-War Period, and through the Cold War was contentious at times, mostly between the US and France, as France sought a dependent and unified Europe with less American involvement. In the beginning of the post war period, France was opposed to regulating relations with Germany and was vocal about it, but the United States overawed this opposition on issues of rearming Western Germany and involving Germany in NATO. France began seeking methods of reconciliation with Western Germany in 1950 in spite of US attempts at keeping a stronger power hold on the region of

Europe, and the United States did actively attempt to prevent these acts from occurring. When Germany and France increased their defense cooperation, specifically in the Franco-German Defense Initiative in 1982, this was actually met by US vocal opposition, as they feared it possibly could weaken the effectiveness of NATO.

43 "GHDI - Document." GHDI - Document. 1964.

44 Ibid.

France and the United States were both original members in NATO, joining in 1949. Germany, this being Western Germany to begin with, joined later on, in 1955, well before the signing of the Elysee treaty. The United States remained a power in Western Europe due to NATO, but when France withdrew their armed forces in 1966 and requested the removal of NATO headquarters from France, relations between the US and France became more incompatible as their interests clearly began to diverge. The United States again did not make conditions for France to stay or rejoin NATO, and did not voice too much concern until France began increasing their direct defense and reconciliation with Germany following this under President Charles de Gaulle. The United States was included as a portion of the Elysee treaty, in the preamble, but de Gaulle was strongly against this portion as he did not want the United States to interfere any further in Europe.⁴⁵ The relationship between the US and Western Germany, and the US and France were very different at the time of this treaty being signed. Western Germany wanted to include the US, and their shared interest of German reunification, which is why the German government had a push to include the United States aspect into the Elysee treaty. France however wanted to create relations bilaterally with Germany with little to no direct involvement

by the United States. One strong factor that could serve as a factor for why US conditionality was not a stronger factor in this case study could be the level of conditionality already being set by regional and international organizations that both nations belonged to, such as the

The second independent variable being observed is the level at which, in this case Germany, has been able to reconcile and repent and to what extent it has been accepted. This

45 Ibid.

Ibid.
Ibid.

variable is measured by observing the number of public acts and apologies given to the victim country or group, the public opinion towards the repentance, and whether or not the nation has met or exceeded demands by the victim nation before an alliance was formed or pushed to be formed.

Following the end of World War II, France did not demand a strong concession and public admission of defeat by Germany, which may have lead to relations to being able to not further deteriorate after the end of the war.⁴⁶ In 1950, West German Chancellor Adenauer called for a regularization and increase in bilateral reconciliation between the two nations. In 1970, at the Warsaw ghetto, West German Chancellor Willy Brandt made a public apology, falling to his knees to express guilt and responsibility towards all of the victims of the Holocaust. This is not a direct apology towards the French, but it is a widespread and public apology for the general atrocities that Germany committed during WW2. In 1985, another West German President stressed the importance of remembering and reconciling the things Germans did as a nation, to Parliament. In 1990, the East German government also acknowledged the need for reconciliation, repentance and issues an apology for all Nazi crimes committed. Germany has made a continuous effort to not only acknowledge the crimes of the past, but also has continued to educate its' population and teach remembrance as a way in which not to diminish the severity of the conflicts it was involved in.

The level of reconciliation has continued to be high into current times. In a 2015 survey conducted by Pew Research Center, the level of reliability as allies between the two former adversaries was measured. This study found that currently despite the early attempts by France to lessen and stifle German growth following World War II, more than three-quarters of German

46 "Reconciliation or Resentment? AICGS." AICGS. May 1, 2009.

citizens see France as a reliable ally. The survey proved that seventy-eight percent (78%) of Germans found France to be a reliable ally, and twenty-one (21%) specifically see Paris as reliable.⁴⁷

The dependent variable is whether a significant and direct defense cooperation has been formed successfully between the two case study nations since the end of the conflict that forced relations to diminish. In this case study a bilateral defense alliance agreement was formed between France and Germany. The alliance between these two European power states was a multistep process, something that developed due to the timing of their alliance and the nature of their past. Cooperation in defense and security in the beginning was often met by opposition by France, and in 1954, France firmly rejected the involvement of German troops in a suggested European armed forces.⁴⁸ This antagonism and opposition by France was not a continued process, and they became more open and willing to create cooperation with Germany beginning in 1957 with the signing of the Rome Treaty which called for cooperation between the two nations.⁴⁹

Official cooperation in defense and security began with the previously mentioned Elysee Treaty, which was not out right a military alliance but did include some military components of cooperation, but they were not followed through on very well, and also were not the main part of

47 "Germany and the United States: Reliable Allies." Pew Research Center's Global Attitudes Project. May 07, 2015.

48 "The Treaty of Rome - History Learning Site." History Learning Site.

49 "France and Germany." Ministry of Foreign Affairs and International Development.

Ibid.
Ibid.

the treaty.⁵⁰ This is not the defining aspect of mutual defense cooperation between the two nations however, but is considered to be the first part of the military alliance process between France and Germany, especially after the French's opposition to West Germany joining the European Defense Community.

A significant aspect of the Post-War defense cooperation is the Franco-German Defense Initiative of 1982, which was the implantation of the defense clauses of the Elysée Treaty calling for common conceptions on security issues between the two nations.⁵¹ Later on, the defense cooperation was increased between Germany and France, with the Franco and German brigade being formed officially in 1990.⁵² This began first as a suggestion by Helmut Kohl in 1987, and was readily received by the French leading to a Franco-German defense council being created in January of 1988.⁵³ This council was the beginning of the Franco-German Brigade. The Brigade consists of three thousand (3,000) to four thousand (4,000) trained soldiers, part German and part French, and rotates a French and a German commander every two years, was created and later became a fundamental part of the Eurocorps under the European Union.⁶³

50 Eddy, Melissa, and Steven Erlanger. "Europe's Odd Couple, France and Germany, 50 Years Later." *The New York Times*. January 22, 2013.

51 Young, Thomas-Durell, and Samuel J. Newman. "Germany, France, and the Future of Western European Security." *Parameters* 20, no. 3 (September 1990).

52 "Military." Franco-German Brigade. Accessed April 12, 2016.

53 Young, Thomas-Durell, and Samuel J. Newman. "Germany, France, and the Future of Western European Security." ⁶³ Ibid.

Overall, there are several aspects for why there was low conditionality by the US in the reconciliation and defense cooperation between Germany and France. In the beginning of the Post-War period, the United States was in the more powerful position and was not intent on forcing reconciliation, and was interested in creating defense cooperation among it's redeveloping allies in Western Europe in hopes of combatting the growing force of the USSR. During this time period, France began a period of increased nationalism under de Gaulle which led to greater tensions between the US and France, but considering the threat of the USSR the allies were not in a place in which relations could be pushed further which is why I believe that conditionality was low but reconciliation occurred.

The second independent variable of reconciliation is present within this case study. Although reconciliation was not an immediate success, and involved several attempts, methods and took time to reach a significant level, there has been reconciliation displayed between France and Germany. Reconciliation involved public speeches and apologies by German leaders, as well as continuing education and remembrance of the conflicts as not to diminish its wrong doings. This has lead to a continued and high level of reconciliation between the two nations even into current times.

Greece and Turkey

Greece and Turkey have been chosen as nations for this paper because of their continued antagonistic relationship, and their involvement with the United States as security allies. Greece and Turkey have had several different phases in their relationship, including times of peace, conflict and tension filled cooperation dating back to 1830 when the Greek nation state was

Ibid.
Ibid.

founded.⁵⁴ In this case, there is conditional support for both case study nations by the United States when they become involved in further conflicts, and do not maintain a reconciled alliance structure. The conditionality in this case is measured using the instances of letters by US officials threatening a withdrawal of support and Congress' embargo in response to an attempted armed invasion by Turkey. The conditionality of the support is also measured by the ability of the conditions to control the conflicts or increase cooperation between the two nations.

Reconciliation in this case is found to be present, despite considering the overall continuance of aggression and poor relations throughout the Cold War period. Reconciliation was found through the joint communique in 1997 to not use force on each other and recognize standing treaties, as well as the increase in diplomatic measures since a natural disaster in the 1990's. The dependent variable is considered to be present due the membership in NATO by both nations as well as the successful implementation of more than 20 bilateral agreements, in which there are specific defense agreements.

In 1923 the Treaty of Lausanne was signed, and it restored full sovereignty rights to Turkey after The Sevres Peace Treaty had essentially dissolved it in 1920.⁵⁵ This directly had an impact on Greek-Turkish relations due to the section in the Treaty of Lausanne where Turkey had to renounce all of its rights to its minorities in its previous territories, but they sought to guarantee the rights of these minorities. This led to Greece and Turkey agreeing to a compulsory exchange of their minorities. This treaty is seen as a marker of the end of a time of war, and created a framework for peaceful relations between all the countries involved and

54 "Greece's Bilateral Relations." Greece's Bilateral Relations.

55 "Treaties of Sèvres and Lausanne." Treaties of Sèvres and Lausanne - All About Turkey.

specifically Greece and Turkey.⁵⁶ These peace efforts were continued into the 1930's, but the majority of the efforts were overtaken by the violent conflicts in Cyprus until the 1970's.⁵⁷

The 1970's began the period of increased tensions between the nations that has lasted to recent times for several reasons. Turkey began to attempt changing the territory decisions and outlines given in the Lausanne Treaty and other international agreements in the 1970's. This as well as the invasion and occupation of Cyprus in 1974, created very conflict and tension filled relations between Turkey and Greece as Turkey continued to question the validity of Greek control on territories in the area. The claims by Turkey have lead to two instances of almost armed conflicts in 1987 and 1996.⁶⁸

The first independent variable that I will be examining is the conditionality of the United States' support for Greece and Turkey despite their continued conflicts. To do this several steps will be taken, including showing the general interest that the US has taken in the two nations overtime, how reliant the nations are on the US for security, and then the level of conditionality will be determined to be either high or low after taking note of any instance in which the US made stated conditions or took actions against the nations during their conflicts.

Greece and Turkey have had joint membership in NATO since 1952. During the beginning of the Cyprus events in the 1950's there were many instances of both nations gathering in front of third parties attempting to make their cases and claims against each other.⁵⁸

56 Ibid.

57 "Greece's Bilateral Relations." ⁶⁸ Ibid.

58 Ibid.

Ibid.
Ibid.

Nothing was ever resolved in these instances, and instead the perpetual cold war tensions remained present between two nations that are important NATO allies. After World War II, both Greece and Turkey pressed the United States for security and protection measures in the 1940's, as they feared Soviet expansion.⁵⁹ Turkey served a special interest for the United States, not solely for the Turkish government's avid spoken "anti-Soviet" sentiment, but rather because the US saw Turkey as a vital piece of airstrip for possible bombing missions against the USSR and a strategic piece to prevent Soviet expansion into the Mediterranean. The US also provided a disproportionate amount of aid to Turkey over Greece in the 1950's.⁷¹

With Greece in comparison however, the United States did not take as much interest or involvement in Greece to begin with. The US stated their overall support for Greece in 1947, but even until 1951, the US would not provide military support for Greece. This changed with the establishment of NATO, and NATO also allowed for the two nations to shift their concern from the greater international conflicts to their own regional issues between themselves.⁶⁰ Greece is not only an important active member to NATO, but also finds NATO to be very important to its own national security. The alliance has allowed for Greece to develop and enhance their defense capabilities as well as help establish their own domestic forms of security.⁶¹

As for conditionality, the US maintained a low level of conditionality in the early stages of Greek and Turkish involvement in NATO. In 1955 during the riots over Cyprus, Secretary of State
59 Krebs, Ronald R. "Perverse Institutionalism: NATO and the Greco-Turkish Conflict." *International Organization* 53, no. 2 (1999): 343-77 ⁷¹ Ibid.

60 Ragoussis, Yiannis. "Greece and NATO: A Long Lasting Relationship." NATO Review – Greece and NATO: A Long Lasting Relationship.

61 Ibid.

State John Foster Dulles sent the same letter to both nations telling them to set aside differences and put cooperation first, as well as hinting at a withdrawal of US support. Greece previously believed that the US would show firm support of Greek interests when the conflict sparked, but was unpleasantly surprised to find that Douglas' letter condemned the antagonism on both sides and pleaded with the two NATO allies to see that Cyprus was not as significant as the larger threat of the USSR to global security.⁶² The letter did not implicitly state but rather implied a hard stance on the two as well as implying a withdraw of US support. Due to the letter's implicit nature and lack of backing, neither nation believed that the US support would truly be withdrawn as they knew they were important to the greater international security issue against the USSR, so the letter did not have a substantive effect.

President Lyndon B. Johnson had a slight bit more success however, as in 1964 his letter threatening US and NATO support withdrawal left the Turkish Prime Minister İnönü, and the 1964 attempted invasion into Cyprus was temporarily averted.⁶³ This letter was very clear in the intent to withdraw all forms of US support to Turkey if they were to make landing on Cyprus, and was written in a rather "undiplomatic" manner. Considering that during this time, the US provided more aid to Turkey than Greece, the fear of losing the aid was strong enough to deter Turkey for the time being. This did lead to the beginning of a questioning period by Turkey of US reliability as an ally.

62 Kalaitzaki, Theodora. "US Mediation in the Greek-Turkish Disputes since 1954." *Mediterranean Quarterly* 16, no. 2 (2005): 106-124.

63 Ragoussis, Yiannis. "Greece and NATO: A Long Lasting Relationship."

Ibid.
Ibid.

The overall ineffectiveness of previous measures of conditionality by the US led to several acts of retaliation by both Greece and Turkey in future conflicts, and more conditional actions by the US. In 1974, Greek President Karamanlis withdrew Greek forces from NATO as a retaliation to the United States inability to prevent a Turkish invasion of Cyprus in 1974. The United States Congress fell to Greek pressure and in 1975 took a new measure of conditionality by issuing an embargo on Turkey, despite opposition by the current US administration, which stopped the delivery of pre-purchased arms as well as the distribution of \$200 million in grants. This was met by Turkey suspending all US military actions in Turkey, and eventually the embargo was lifted in 1978. This unsuccessful attempt to maintain an upper hand on both nations through threats and actions of conditionality by the United States led to Greece and Turkey becoming disillusioned with the US as an ally and seeking to lower their dependency.⁶⁴

Since the end of the Cold War, there has been a significant shift in the relationships between Turkey, Greece and the United States, specifically and most importantly in terms of military issues. The US became involved in a war with Iraq and a war on terror in 2003, which took place on Turkey's border with Iraq and began a significant period of decline in the relationship between the two allies since the Turkish Parliament rejected the vote to become involved in the US-Iraq war.⁶⁵ The ensuing conflicts in the Middle East over the past decade have lead to a continued strain in the relationship between the two nations, such as the Turkish stance on ISIS, the Kurdish conflict, the military coup in Turkey, and as their overall interests

64 Kalaitzaki, Theodora. "US Mediation in the Greek-Turkish Disputes since 1954."

65 Boyer, Spencer P., and Brian Katulis. "The Neglected Alliance Restoring U.S.-Turkish Relations to Meet 21st Century Challenges." December 2008.

diverge.⁶⁶ This overall change in the relations between the US and Turkey has led to a decrease in significance of the alliance between the two. However, considering the strength that the US holds in NATO and the several instances in which Turkey has attempted to go against the rules of NATO, such as the attempt to purchase weapons from China, and was then met with US opposition and then agreed to regulations in place, any conditions the US were to place on Turkey following the decrease in overall relations would have the same effect as before the downturn in relations.⁶⁷

The second independent variable that will be explored is the level of reconciliation between the two nations that has occurred. This will include any public apologies or reconciliation acts by the leaders of the nations, times of increased peace and cooperation measures, whether the public has received those acts well, as well as if the US took a part in creating those public measures.

In the early stages of the Cold War, relations between Greece and Turkey seemed to be on the way to stable and positive. Turkish President Celal Bayar stated on a visit to Greece in January of 1954 that Greco-Turkish cooperation showed “the best example of how the two countries who mistakenly mistrusted each other for centuries have agreed upon a close and loyal collaboration as a result of recognition of the realities of life.”⁶⁸ This however was then followed

66 Ibid.

67 Cagaptay, Soner. "The Fragile Thaw in U.S.-Turkish Relations." *The Fragile Thaw in U.S.-Turkish Relations - The Washington Institute for Near East Policy*. April 7, 2015

68 Kalaitzaki, Theodora. "US Mediation in the Greek-Turkish Disputes since 1954."

Ibid.
Ibid.

by a Turkish attempt to take over Cyprus later that year, showing that there was not significant reconciliation at that time.

In 1997, with the US as a facilitator, a joint communique was signed that called for no force to be used against each other and observe the already standing treaties between the two nations over their biggest source of conflict, Cyprus.⁶⁹ In 1999, a time period of rapprochement was created bilaterally, cooperation was created in the economic sector, and military tensions were released by improving and initiating cooperation between the two nations' armed forces.⁷⁰ There has been significant instances of reconciliation between the two nations since the most recent Cyprus conflicts and there has been instances instances of peaceful rapprochement in other areas of relations as well.

The dependent variable is whether there has been significant, direct mutual cooperation between the two nations. Defense cooperation will be considered as specific defense agreements, mutual security cooperation deals, security alliances, and agreements that account for direct cooperation between the two nations being observed in the case studies. For this variable the different types of defense cooperation will be accounted for in bilateral and multilateral defense alliances and will only be considered if it is a significant level and direct between the case nations.

Turkey and Greece have both been members of NATO since 1952, meaning they have both been members after and during their various conflicts throughout the time period being studied. NATO itself is a military based institution, which calls for military cooperation between

69 Bohlen, Celestine. "At Long Last, Greece and Turkey Tiptoe Toward Reconciliation." The New York Times. 1997.

70 "Greece's Bilateral Relations."

it's members on security issues.⁷¹ NATO member states are able to withdraw from the organization after 20 years of membership, and are also allowed to withdraw their military from the organization but still remain members, which Greece did and then later reinstituted their military to NATO in 1980. Since 1999 there have been more than 20 bilateral agreements signed and implemented, and in 1997 with the US as a facilitator a joint communique was signed that called for no force to be used against each other and observe the already standing treaties.⁷² There has been, despite continued tensions between the two nations, direct cooperation between the two nations. This cooperation is not only due to the attempts at lessening tension between the nations, but also in large part due to the United States taking a somewhat active role in the cooperation measures of the two. The United States' ability to push for cooperation is less effective now as in the past, but it was effective as a facilitator in the 1997 joint-communique.

Israel and The Gulf States

In the case study of Israel and The Gulf States, there is unconditional support by the United States to both nations, but in more uneven unconditional support by the US to Israel. The unconditional support can be seen through the continuous financial and military aid given to Israel by the United States, despite the many conflicts over the years between Israel and many Arab nations including the Gulf States. The US has not sought increased relations between its two larger allies in the region, and does not call for the Gulf States to recognize Israel as a nation. There has been no form of reconciliation between Israel and the Gulf Nations. There has

71 Couloumbis, Theodore A., and Alexander E. Kentikelenis. "Greek–Turkish Relations and the Kantian Democratic Peace Theory." *Southeast European and Black Sea Studies* 7, no. 4 (2007): 517-32.

72 Bohlen, Celestine. "At Long Last, Greece and Turkey Tiptoe Toward Reconciliation."

Ibid.
Ibid.

been a recent increase in rapprochement between the the adversaries, with closed door meetings occurring, as well as a shared interest in the growth of their biggest mutual threats, Iran and ISIS. There is defense cooperation between the nations seen in several forms of arms sales, and deals involving the trading of defense technology and secrets between the two.⁷³

For this paper the Gulf States will be considered to be the six (6) member states of the Gulf Cooperation Council (GCC), Saudi Arabia, Qatar, the United Arab Emirates, Bahrain, Oman, and Kuwait, and will be referred to as the Gulf States from this point, unless a specific member nation is being referred to. Saudi Arabia is the largest and considered to be the most powerful member of the GCC, and therefore most comparisons will be drawn in relation to this nation. The United States' involvement in the Gulf States began in 1933 with the beginning of the US seeking relations with Saudi Arabia over Saudi Arabian oil.⁷⁴ Official diplomacy between the two nations began with the meeting between President Franklin D. Roosevelt and King Abdulaziz in 1945.⁷⁵ Israel and the United States have had close relations since the founding of Israel in 1948.⁷⁶ The US has served as a security power and defensive form of deterrent for Israel for decades, and often considers Israel before making policy or security decisions in the Middle

73 Ramani, Samuel. "Israel Is Strengthening Its Ties with The Gulf Monarchies." The Huffington Post. September 12, 2016.

74 Scott, Matthew D. *Evolution of the Gulf, U.S.-Gulf Relations, and Prospects for the Future*. Master's thesis, Claremont McKenna College, 2016. CMC Senior Theses. Paper 1440.

75 Ibid.

76 Zanoliti, Jim. "Israel: Background and U.S. Relations." *Congressional Research Service*, October 28, 2016.

East because of their close ties.⁷⁷

Israel and the Gulf States both view the United States as important allies for several reasons and dating back for decades. The US provides Israel with over \$3 billion annually from taxes paid by United States citizens to fund the Israeli military. In contrast, the United States provides Saudi Arabia with guards for the royal family from the US military, and Saudi Arabia is the largest purchaser of US weapons.⁷⁸ The two nations themselves see the US as a vital alliance relationship, but they do not partake in diplomacy themselves, and Saudi Arabia and the rest of the Gulf States have never recognized Israel as a nation due to their sympathetic view with the Palestinians who have been in a continuous conflict with Israel since the founding of the

⁷⁷ Ibid.

⁷⁸ Benjamin, Medea. "Israel and Saudi Arabia: Strange Bedfellows in the New Middle East - FPIF." Foreign Policy In Focus. May 18, 2016.

Ibid.
Ibid.

nation.⁷⁹ In more recent times, the Gulf States and Israel have been discovered to have been meeting to discuss issues in the region that have created mutual threats to both nations, but nothing substantive has developed from this.

The central conflicts between Israel and the Gulf States are the Israeli-Palestinian conflict, as well as several Israeli wars in the Middle East region involving Arab nations.⁸⁰ In 1948 following the creation of Israel as a nation by partitioning portion of Palestine, the Arab nations greatly objected this and began an armed conflict against Israel. The Israeli army was able to defeat the armies of the Arab nations that attacked, including Saudi Arabia.⁸¹ In 1956 Israel was involved in the invasion on Egypt over the nationalization of the Suez Canal, with the UK and France, but the invasion was ended by the United States pressure on the nations.⁸² In 1967 Israel launched a “preemptive attack” on Egypt, Syria, and Jordan to combat the placement of Arab troops along its borders. Egypt and Syria then attacked Israel on the Jewish Holy day of Yom Kippur in 1973, and were successfully deterred by Israeli forces.

The Camp David Accords then followed in 1978, which was signed between Egypt, Israel, and the United States and was viewed by many in the Arab world as betrayal by Egypt even though the United States and Israel saw the treaty in a positive light. Saudi Arabia cut ties

⁷⁹ Ibid.

⁸⁰ Ramani, Samuel. "Israel Is Strengthening Its Ties with The Gulf Monarchies."

⁸¹ Sharp, Jeremy M. "U.S. Foreign Aid to Israel." *Congressional Research Service*, June 10, 2015.

⁸² Ibid.

Ibid.

with Egypt until more recent times due to their opposition of this treaty.⁹⁵ The Israeli-Egyptian peace treaty of 1979 was facilitated by the United States who in an attempt to create sustained peace between the two nations offered them each \$7.9 billion to sign the treaty and end the conflict. This treaty led to an increase in tensions between Egypt and the Arab world, and led to

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a cutting of ties between Saudi Arabia and Egypt.⁹⁶ There have also been continued violence and attempts to stifle the Palestinian citizens from uprising against Israeli leaders, and often the violence by Israeli soldiers is extreme in terms of the situation. This as well as incidents such as the bombing of Lebanon in 1996, have been the sources of contention between the Gulf States and Israel since the creation of Israel after WWII.

For the variable of conditionality of support by the United States to both Israel and the Gulf States is deemed as being unconditional. The United States especially has a high level of unconditional support for Israel, as it has continuously provided aid, support, and has over ruled several international calls for the return of land to Palestine within the United Nations. The United States has continuously provided aid, loans and assurance of military protection to Israel despite the heated relations between Israel and many nations within the Middle East. Aid to Israel started in 1949 with a \$100 million loan, and has continued to grow in amount and scope of uses since that date. As Israel continued to become involved in wars with various Arab and Middle Eastern nations, the US did not withdraw, make threats to withdraw or lessen the amount of financial and armed support it was providing to Israel. When Israel began to find itself

Ibid.
Ibid.

involved in more and more armed conflicts, the amount of United States aid began to increase, especially following the refusal of other western allies of Israel such as France under Charles de Gaulle, to provide assistance to the Israeli military after its “preemptive strike” that began the Six Day War.⁹⁷

Since the Iranian Revolution in 1979 that led to a loss in US relations with Iran, the Gulf States have increasingly become more important to the United States as an ally to the region. This has lead to not only bilateral defense cooperation initiatives between the United States and

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several of the GCC states, but also the Gulf States began to serve as a key asset not only in the Gulf but also in the Middle East as a whole. The Gulf States provide a significant amount of transportation and infrastructure in the whole region for the United States. The Gulf States, notably Saudi Arabia have recently become very vocal in criticism of US policy initiatives, including the perceived inaction by the United States on the Syrian War, as well as the US relations with Iran. In 2012, the US and the Gulf States created the U.S.-GCC Strategic Cooperation Forum.⁸³ The United States despite this growing trend of vocal discontent has not shown any withdrawal of support. In March, 2014, President Obama visited Saudi Arabia was intended to reassure the Gulf States’ governments, and former Secretary of State Hillary Clinton said in a speech at the first US- GCC security forum in 2012 that the US had a “rock solid and unwavering” commitment to the Gulf States.⁹⁹

83 Shayji, Abdullah K. Al. "The GCC-U.S. Relationship: A GCC Perspective." *Middle East Policy* 21, no. 3 (2014): 60-70.

Ibid.

In more recent times, the US and Israeli alliance has shifted in terms of goals, with the United States shifting its interests in a way that does not align with Israeli interests, but has continued financial and military support. With the Iranian Nuclear deal that was created in 2015, the US was met with vocal opposition by Israeli Prime Minister, Benjamin Netanyahu, as Israel continues to see Iran as a threat to its national security. The United States was not influenced by this disagreement however, which was of great surprise to the Israeli government, who prior to the finalization of the deal attempted to lobby for the rejection of the deal to the US Congress. The United States despite the shifts in foreign policy goals and interests, does not show any signs of abandoning Israel as an ally, or beginning to place conditions on support to Israel.

Reconciliation has not been achieved between the two nations, although there has been a recent increase in the level of rapprochement and dialogue between the two parties. During a

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June 2015 Council of Foreign Relations event in Washington, diplomats from both Saudi Arabia and Israel revealed covert diplomatic meetings between the two countries over Iran's nuclear ambitions.⁸⁴ There are still several types of bans and boycotts in place over Israeli goods, but recent times have seen an increase of contraband goods being brought into Saudi Arabia. There is still a standing consensus among the Gulf States however that Israel is not a recognized nation due to their continued strife with Palestine and history in the Arab community, but the Gulf States have begun a process of rapprochement through beginning to allow small economic and business ventures to occur, even though some are still illegal. There is also a ban on travel into the UAE against Israelis, but Israel has created its first diplomatic mission in the UAE in

84 Ibid.

Ibid.
Ibid.

November, 2015. Qatar has also sought to normalize relations with Israel after they severed all ties with the Israeli attack on the Gaza strip.¹⁰¹

Defense cooperation has been created between the Gulf States and Israel, although it is very limited in scope. Despite the Gulf States not publically acknowledging Israel as a nation in the international community, and although the GCC nations view Israel as a threat still, there have been a recent increase in defense cooperation between both parties. The Gulf States' officials have created covert defense deals with the Israeli military in order to gain access to the Israeli Defense Forces military technology. In 2011, Israeli companies sold around \$300 million of military technology to the UAE. There have also been reports of sharing their iron dome technology with Saudi Arabia to protect it from Yemeni rocket launches. There have also been smaller forms of military cooperation as Israel-GCC interests overlap in anti-Iran military initiatives.¹⁰²

South Korea and Japan

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In the case study of Japan and South Korea, there is conditional support by the United States. There is a low level of reconciliation, as the governments of both nations have forced agreements and cooperation on the issues at the core of the conflicts between the nations that often lead to a resurgence of discontent. There have been some attempts at reconciliation between the two nations, including the apologies by Japanese leaders, and the most recent deal for settling the Comfort Women issue from the Japanese colonization of Korea, but these have often been negated to the Korean people by either actions following the apology or the feeling that the victims have not been considered to a high enough degree.

Ibid.

Japan and South Korean relations have been troubled for a long time, with the most current issues being credited to the colonization of Korea by Japan in the early 20th century.⁸⁵ During this colonization, the Korean people were harshly repressed and even tortured by the Japanese, something that still holds much resentment in current times.⁸⁶ Japan began to “recruit” South Korean men into the Japanese army during WWII, as well as taking over Japanese jobs left open by the Japanese men who left to fight, doing this in order to maintain their own economy during the war.¹⁰⁵ Japan also took many Korean women to serve as “comfort women” during the war, one of the largest and currently considered as one of the most important issues impairing Korean and Japanese relations.¹⁰⁶ Relations between Japan and the Republic of Korea have seen several shifts in terms of cooperation and overall willingness to converse about the past, and are most due to the interest and pressure by the United States to open dialogue as well as which president and political faction is in power.

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South Korea and Japan each have bilateral alliance agreements with the United States.⁸⁷

Japan formed an alliance with the United States in 1951, called the U.S.- Japan Mutual Security

85 "An Overview of North Korea-Japan Relations." — *National Committee on North Korea*. Web. 14 Apr. 2016.

86 Ibid.

87 “Powerplay: Origins of the U.S. Alliance System in Asia”.¹⁰⁸ Ibid.¹⁰⁹ Ibid.

Ibid.
Ibid.

Treaty, which began as a ten year treaty that could be renewed overtime.¹⁰⁸ South Korea and the United States signed a mutual defense treaty in October 1953.¹⁰⁹ The US has been heavily involved in the East Asian region in general, but more specifically has been heavily involved in the relationship between Japan and South Korea, often pushing for an alliance to form to complete their network triangle, and create stronger mutual defense systems considering the growing threats in the region.¹¹⁰ The US has often pushed for the two nations to have summit meetings, create deals and increase diplomatic ties over time to increase the likelihood to form an alliance.¹¹¹

The level of conditionality of the United States to Japan and Korea is very present and can be considered to be high. The US has continuously made efforts to pressure its two allies in North East Asia to move past their issues dating back to early 1900's, and has shown a continuous lack of understanding of the fundamental concerns by the citizens of both nations. The United States has been a present party in large amount of the apologies or communications between the two nations over the course of history, either simply in their pressure of government officials to move past their historical issues, or by facilitating the acts themselves. In the 1965 treaty normalizing relations for the first time following the Korean War, then US Ambassador to Japan Edwin O. Reischauer was responsible for the language used in the negotiations referring to the colonization as an "unhappy past".

¹¹⁰ ¹¹¹

Ibid.

The involvement of the US in this first step of normalizing relations was later revealed in recently declassified Johnson administration papers that the overall and pragmatic view of the US administration of the time saw normalization of relations between the two nations to be at the forefront of concern for US policy in the region.⁸⁸ The “apology” was concluded to only have occurred due to the insistence by Reischauer in 1964 that Japan needed to recognize its colonization of Korea to engage in normal relations, Foreign Minister Etsusaburo Shiina responded that there would be “as close to expression of apology as was feasible” which the Amb. responded to positively and shows the overall lack of understanding and concern for the actual issue between the two nations by the United States.¹¹³

The United States has been both conditional and also unconditional in terms of their relations with Korea and Japan. In terms of being firm and demanding the two move on from the past historical conflicts and attempts to create this and foster increased cooperation before the Korean public has even accepted Japanese apologies show a high level of conditionality present as a larger ally to both nations. However, the lack of regard for the actual apology, continued pressure on Korea, who is the victim, to accept whatever statement or agreement Japan presents shows a level of unconditional toleration of Japan and stricter conditionality is placed upon Korea within this alliance structure. The United States does not consider it a priority that the Korean people and government feel as though Japan has provided a legitimate and quality apology and instead would prefer to have both nations fully focus and develop a security framework to combat the threats of China and North Korea. The US has even tolerated Japan’s

88 Dudden, Alexis. "Japan's Political Apologies and the Right to History." *Program on U.S.-Japan Relations*, Harvard University. 2006.

Ibid.
Ibid.

own version of history in their textbooks, and also delay the declassification of US Department of State documents that showed US policy on Japan during the “unhappy” period.⁸⁹

Japan has not made many efforts to make apologies to South Korea for the harm and suffering it created for the South Korean public during the colonialization. Japan has made some attempts at public apologies for some aspects of the harm it has done to South Korea, but it has not repented near to the level demanded by both the Korean people and government. The first sign of an act of reconciliation was accomplished through normalizing relations in 1965, but the statements made previous to the signing of the agreement referring to the colonization of Korea by Japan as an “unhappy past” between the two nations continued discontent.⁹⁰ This phrase was again used in the meeting between Korean President Chun Doo Hwan and Emperor Hirohito in Chun’s visit to Japan in 1984, and this was the first time that the Emperor had publically acknowledged the troubled past between the two nations.¹¹⁶ The phrasing of what Koreans consider to be a central conflict and painful memory in their history lead many to feel as though

Japan was continuously diminishing their responsibility and therefore the “apology” was not accepted as a sincere act.

In 1998, Japanese Prime Minister Keizo Obuchi issued a written apology to President Kim Dae Jung, which served as the first written apology to South Korea from Japan.¹¹⁷ This apology took a similar tone of being future facing and regarding the issues at the heart of Korean discontent as

⁸⁹ Ibid.

⁹⁰ Dudden, Alexis. "Japan's Political Apologies and the Right to History."

Ibid.

simply things that Japan “regrets” from “the past” of the two nations. A significant apology was given in 1993 by Yohei Kono, who acknowledged in full after a study was

116
117

Ibid.
Ibid.

conducted to determine the exact number of comfort women the Japanese had victimized, and Kono's statement used full apologetic terms and remorseful language.⁹¹ Prime Minister Abe called the statement into review to test the validity of the study in 2014 which led to a large amount of discontent among Koreans, but after the review the statement was left standing.¹¹⁹ Several of the public statements and apologies by Japanese officials have not only left the Korean citizens feel unsatisfied by the acknowledgement of their suffering, but on several occasions following these apologies Japanese officials have negated their words with their actions by visiting the controversial Yasukuni Shrine dedicated to war heroes, but also includes the notable Japanese war criminals of WWII.⁹² Abe also, in a 2015 apology acknowledged the wrongdoings of the past, but also stated that "We must not let our children, grandchildren, and even further generations to come, who have nothing to do with that war, be predestined to apologize" which was accepted in a similar manner to previous apologies.¹²¹

One of the largest issues that plague the Japanese and Korean relationship is the comfort women issue, as Japan often does not acknowledge this happened to Korean women. In late 2015, a deal was made by the two governments, in which the remaining, living comfort women in South Korea will be given monetary compensation for their pain and suffering.⁹³ This deal created by the two governments was widely opposed and rejected by the Korean public, and it is

91 Fifiield, Anna. "A (very) short history of Japan's war apologies." Washington Post. August 13, 2015. ¹¹⁹ Ibid.

92 Yoshida, Reiji. "Akie Abe pays visit to war-linked Yasukuni Shrine." Japan Times. May 22, 2015. ¹²¹ "Japan's Apologies for World War II." The New York Times. August 12, 2015.

93 Arrington, Celeste. "Can Japan and Korea 'resolve' the question of Japan's Korean sex slaves during WWII?" Washington Post. January 13, 2016.

not only the older population with living memories of the conflicts between the two nations. A poll of Korean citizens following the deal showed that 54% of people opposed the deal for the lack of involvement and consideration of the victims themselves.

The deal calls for the removal of a controversial statue in front of the Japanese embassy in Seoul, and the survey also showed that two-thirds of those surveyed opposed this, and 86% participants in their 20's oppose it. This is intended to be a large show of reconciliation, but it has been received as a rushed attempt for both heads of state, facilitated by the United States to place the remaining unsolved issues of the past behind the two nations, and provided measures if passed that ensured that Koreans would no longer bring up the issue of comfort women, and the statue dedicated to the comfort women would be removed from in front of the Japanese embassy. The Japanese and United States were perceived to have received the better end of the deal of this apology, as Japan could finally prevent their past issues with Korea from resurfacing and embarrassing them in the international community, and the United States could move their allies towards mutual cooperation and focus them on the larger security threats in the region. However, this apology attempt was unsuccessful and likely scarred relations between the two nations even further.

Japan and South Korea have not been able to create direct mutual defense cooperation. They have become closer in recent times to creating a source of defense cooperation, but have not created a formal alliance or form of security or defense cooperation to date. The two do not have their own forms of cooperation, but instead any forms of cooperation on military issues are conducted through the alliance triangle with the United States.

7. Conclusions, Predictions, and Further Research

Figure 1: Summary of Findings in Case Studies

Case Study	Conditional US Support	Reconciliation	Direct Defense Cooperation
France and Germany	Unconditional	Yes	Yes
Turkey and Greece	Conditional	Yes	Yes
Israel and The Gulf States	Unconditional	No	Yes
Japan and South Korea	Conditional	No	No

The overall findings of this research is that the hypotheses are not supported. Recall that the hypotheses for this paper are as follows:

Hypothesis 1: If the U.S. commitment is *conditional*, the states *will* reconcile.

Hypothesis 2: If the U.S. alliance is *unconditional*, the states *will not* reconcile

Hypothesis 3: When there is both conditionality and reconciliation, there will be direct mutual defense cooperation.

Hypothesis 4: When there is unconditional support and no reconciliation, there will not be direct mutual defense cooperation.

The case study of Greece and Turkey was the only case study out of the four that supported the hypotheses completely. In the Greece and Turkey case study there was conditional support by the United States, there has been an accepted amount of reconciliation, and there has also been mutual defense cooperation. The two case studies that showed unconditional support

by the United States, both had the dependent variable of defense cooperation present, but France and Germany were found to have reconciliation, while the case study of Israel and the Gulf States were found not to have reconciliation. The Japan and South Korea case study showed that even with conditionality of US support present in the relationship of the nations, reconciliation is not always an outcome, and neither is defense cooperation. Reconciliation is not considered to be a large factor in terms of defense cooperation, considering reconciliation was defined as involving recognition and apologies for the conflict. Reconciliation however is shown to be somewhat of a factor in creating defense cooperation since it was present in two of the four case studies that also showed defense cooperation.

There are several aspects for why conditionality by the US was low in the reconciliation and defense cooperation between Germany and France. In the beginning of the Post-War period, the United States was in the more powerful position and was not intent on forcing reconciliation, and was interested in creating defense cooperation among it's redeveloping allies in Western Europe in hopes of combatting the growing force of the USSR. During this time period, France began a period of increased nationalism under de Gaulle which led to greater tensions between the US and France, but considering the threat of the USSR the allies were not in a place in which relations could be pushed further which is why I believe that conditionality was low but reconciliation occurred. Conditionality in this case has proved to be a complicated variable, as I firmly believe that the entire political atmosphere, compounded with the United States' continued push for a strong presence, other international and regional organizations with conditions, France being a developed power and stronger US ally, as well as a reunified and stronger Germany following the war and throughout the Cold War served as enough conditionality for the two nations to have increased cooperation and reconciliation; however I

believe that these factors do not follow my defined criteria for conditionality and therefore it must be declared as unconditional.

Conditionality, if not used effectively, can lead to a reverse of power, and leave the previous cardholder to become a ploy and become caught between two bickering adversaries even when those adversaries are supposed to be allies. Conditionality is only effective when used quickly, firmly, stated clearly, and followed through with actions when necessary, as well as can only be an effective tool when there is truly an imbalance of power in an asymmetrical alliance. The case of France and German where there is very little evidence of conditionality by the US is due to the overall global climate, but also in large part due to the lack of power hold over France as an ally. The unconditional support, or simply ineffective and low conditionality, in the case of Greece and Turkey is not for lack of “effort”, but lack of genuine and quickly implemented effort by the United States in terms of both allies. The US attempted to place soft conditionality on both nations equally, as well as show disregard and lack of concern on the issue between them in relation to issues the US sees as important to its own interests is what lead to the power reversal and slow decline in the overall alliance between the two nations and the US.

The lack of interest in the disputes between Greece and Turkey by the United States mirrors the issue in the case of Japan and South Korea, but the two serve as a more important tool currently for the United States interests in North East Asia. The US should therefore seek to truly take an interest in the issues between Japan and South Korea, creating a mediation while showing genuine interest in the conflict from both points of view even though the issues important to both nations’ citizens may seem trivial to the US on a larger scale. If the US truly seeks a strong defense alliance and working relations between Japan and Korea, which should be at the forefront of its policy in the region to combat the growing threat of the unpredictable

North Korea and to place pressure on China, it should place at its center focus the mediation of the issues that the people of the two nations see their strongest deterrent to cooperation. This includes listening to the plight of the Comfort Women, the dispute over the Dokdo or Takeshima Islands also known as the Liancourt Rocks, and other issues that are at the core of the cultural disputes between Japan and South Korea.

Conditionality overall is a complex variable that needs further exploration to determine if there is an effective method of conditional support in alliances. Further research considerations I propose might be useful in determining the factors that allow for successful implementation of conditionality involve exploring the effect of different US Presidents, conservative and liberal, on creating successful conditionality measures. Another aspect that may impact conditionality is the presence and significance of a mutual threat between the US and its' alliance partners in terms of how high the threat is and if this leads to higher or lower conditionality, and then if it is more successful or less successful in high threat situations. One more proposed further research topic is the effect of nuclear weapons states on the successfulness of conditionality.

Considerations for the Future

In the coming years, with the new United States administration there has been increased speculation on how US alliance structure in key regions, such as the case studies above, might shift. In terms of the United States alliance with Western European powers such as France and Germany, I do not think that there will be a large shift in power considering the longstanding alliances between the global superpowers, but I do predict that the growing nationalist sentiment among America, the United Kingdom and France could create a return to cold war tensions and shift power dynamics to an extent. With the rise of uncertainty and unpredictability in the world in recent years, it is likely that Russia will continue to grow as a source of

antagonism to the United States and other Western powers and this may lead to a shift back to the US and the UK to becoming a stronger alliance and relying less on others in the region. If this were to occur, it is likely that France and Germany would seek to strengthen their ties even more than they have since the Brexit vote, and it could lead to increased cooperation.

More likely however is the shift in the United States alliances with nations who rely more heavily on the US for military and financial support with the coming administration. I believe that, considering the already weakened relations and state of the governments of Turkey and Greece, if these two nations are pushed too hard to take on more responsibility or conditionality is too high by the US, then it will lead to a fallout in relations between not only the two nations themselves, but could have the potential to seek other powers as their new form of security. With Turkey, this was evident when they began to see the United States as an unreliable ally and began to consider shifting to Russia as a new major ally.

Similar considerations should be taken when addressing the very complex and unresolved tensions between South Korea and Japan. Despite the threat that both Japan and South Korea feel from North Korea on a consistent basis, they are in a much more stable region than some other major US allies such as Saudi Arabia and Israel, and even Turkey and Greece. President Donald Trump has on several occasions mentioned that South Korea and Japan should be given more responsibility over their own security or in the least pay the United States more per year for the costs of US protection. What is not being considered here is the overall complexity of the relations in the triangular alliance in North East Asia. The United States has been able to hold the two nations to a level of conditionality because of the longstanding threat that the DPRK and China have been to security in the region. However, the United States has more of an interest in the region and in protecting its' two major allies than the President seems

to realize, and that the general consensus among Korean and Japanese citizens about American military presence is far from positive. If Donald Trump creates a shift in US policy towards the two allies, even if it involves strengthening ties with one of the two, it has the potential to create more anti-American sentiment among citizens of the two nations, but it is not likely that a shift in policy would lead to the changing of the alliance structure. What is more likely is that the overall policy of the

United States will be closely aligned to previous years in regards to Japan and South Korea.

Since President Trump has taken office, there has been an increased level of threat from North Korea. Kim Jong Un has become more antagonistic since President Trump's inauguration, with the regime actively testing missiles and seeking intercontinental nuclear weapons capabilities. On Sunday April 16th, 2017, one day after holding a massive military parade for founder Kim Il Sung's birthday, the DPRK attempted to launch a ballistic missile which exploded almost immediately after being launched.⁹⁴ This was followed by Vice President

Pence making a visit to the Demilitarized Zone and holding a joint press conference with current South Korean President Hwang, in which Pence reiterated the United States commitment to the ROK. Vice President Pence spoke on behalf of President Trump stating "unwavering support of the United States for our longstanding alliance with South Korea" as well as addressing that nothing will change in the alliance structure once the South Korean election occurs in May.¹²⁴

94 Hancocks, Paula, and Barbara Starr. "North Korean missile test fails, US says." CNN. April 18, 2017. ¹²⁴ "Remarks by the Vice President and South Korean Acting President Hwang at a Joint Press Statement." The White House. April 17, 2017.

Pence also expressed on behalf of Trump that “We are with you 100 percent. Even in these troubled times, we stand with you for a free and secure future.”⁹⁵

With the expression of unwavering support by the United States, and the presence of a high ranking official visiting the region following North Korean provocations, this leads me to believe that the US commitment is being solidified even more, which likely will impede the reconciliation and cooperation by South Korea and Japan for the time being. Rather than the US calling on both Japanese and South Korean officials, and paying close attention to the importance of both nations cooperating against the growing threat of North Korea, the US focusing on Seoul is likely going to lead to a distance between Japan and Korea as neither of them need to increase cooperation to ensure their security, for the time being. However, considering the overwhelming unpredictability of not only Kim Jong Un, but President Trump as well, I do not believe that the statements of support are completely genuine and permanent. I believe that this is simply circumstantial and a way for President Trump to solidify his campaign statements of returning to a powerful US international presence, and if the threat lessens we will see a retraction of US attention to the region like Trump promised in his campaign.

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95 Ibid.

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